Showing posts with label Gender Stereotyping. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Gender Stereotyping. Show all posts

Saturday, February 20, 2010

Termination and Employer Missteps


Brenna Lewis worked in a front desk position at Heartland Inns. In that capacity, Lewis received good performance reviews and at least one positive customer comment. Lewis was eventually promoted to the "A Shift," a premium shift from 7:00 am to 3:00 pm. Shortly after starting the A Shift, Barb Cullinan, Defendant's Director of Operations, saw Ms. Lewis and wasn't pleased. In fact, she called Lewis's manager and said Lewis was not a "good fit," that Lewis lacked the "Midwestern girl look," and that the front desk staff should be "pretty." Cullinan subsequently ordered a second interview of Lewis. Cullinan also installed video equipment to view interviewees. To her surprise, Lewis knew about Cullinan's comments and, at the interview, mentioned that she felt the new second interview requirement was illegal. In the interview, Lewis, in addition to questioning the legality of the second interview, made some suggestions to Cullinan regarding Defendant's business practices. Three days later, Lewis was fired.

On January 21, 2010, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendant on Lewis's retaliation and gender stereotyping claims. According to the Eighth Circuit, the district court improperly required Lewis to produce evidence that she was treated differently than similarly situated males in order to satisfy the fourth prong of the McDonnell Douglas test. Instead, Lewis was permitted to rely on evidence of pretext or evidence of discriminatory comments (both of which Lewis was able to establish.)
The Court also reaffirmed the validity of gender stereotype claims quoting Smith v. City of Salem, Ohio, "[a]fter Price Waterhouse, an employer who discriminates against women because, for instance, they do not wear dresses or makeup, is engaging in sex discrimination because the discrimination would not occur but for the victim's sex." The takes aim at gender stereotyping claims, while noting that Price Waterhouse was a mere plurality, "[a]pparently, the majority would hold that an employer violates Title VII if it declines to hire a female cheerleader because she is not pretty enough, or a male fashion model because he is not handsome enough, unless the employer proves the affirmative defense that physical appearance is a bona fide occupational qualification." As this demonstrates, the fight over gender stereotyping claims rages on.

The Court also reinstated Lewis's retaliation claim reiterating that "[i]n making out a prima facie retaliation claim, Lewis need not prove the merits of the underlying claim of sex discrimination. She can establish protected conduct 'as long as [she] had a reasonable, good faith belief that there were grounds for a claim of discrimination." According to the Court, Lewis's knowledge that she was possibly the only one subject to the second interview, that Cullinan had made sexually-charged comments, and her statement that such conduct was illegal meant she had engaged in "protected conduct, including opposition to an action prohibited by Title VII."

The facts of Lewis reveal two important missteps taken by the employer: it failed to follow its normal termination procedures and its reason for termination was based on interview at which only Lewis and Cullinan were present. To wit, when analyzing whether Lewis had established that Defendant's reason for terminating Lewis was pretextual, the Court noted that "Lewis and Cullinan, the only two individuals in the room, portray the encounter in starkly different terms. On summary judgment we must construe the conversation in the light most favorable to Lewis, however.

In short, don't engage in gender stereotyping. The words "he's not masculine enough" or "she's not feminine enough" should not be in employers' vocabularies. Additionally, don't base a termination on an interview at which only the employer and the employee are present. This is almost certain to generate a question of fact. Finally, follow procedures. If you don't, you are asking for unfavorable inferences.

Click here for a copy of the Court's opinion.

Friday, February 19, 2010

Gender Stereotyping and Sexual Orientation

On January 8, 2010, the Southern District of Florida, in Anderson v. Napolitano, granted summary judgement for defendant regarding plaintiff's gender stereotyping claim. Specifically, the Court felt that plaintiff's complaint merely demonstrated that his co-workers discriminated against him because he was gay, and not because he failed to act in a masculine fashion. In doing so, the Court held that being told he was "too flamboyant" was not the same as being told he failed to act in a masculine fashion. Furthermore, pointing to an incident where two co-workers lisped and spoke in flamboyant voices, but then stopped when they say plaintiff, was not relevant because there was no corresponding evidence that plaintiff had an effeminate voice.

In dismissing this case, the Court reaffirmed that Title VII does not protect discrimination based on sexual orientation. In that sense, being called a "fag" and "too gay" did nothing for plaintiff's claim. Furthermore, in order to state a gender stereotyping claim, homosexual males must show evidence demonstrating that they were discriminated against, not because they are gay, but because they did not act masculine enough.

Click here for a copy of the Court's opinion.